Chapter 9 of the Act of Amending Articles of the Act of the Fourth Economic, Social and Cultural Development Plan of Islamic Republic of Iran, which addresses competition facilitation and prohibition of monopoly, has designated the Competition Council as the highest regulatory body on functioning of economic actors and diverse markets to provide access to healthy competition and achieving high purposes of the Act through identifying anti-competitive practices and preventing monopolistic conducts. Functioning of the Competition Council indicates that the body has been faced with difficulties ever since its establishment in a way that prevent its optimal performance. Using field research, seminar sessions and expert dialogue with scholars and experts of competition and monopoly and with members of the Council, the article analyses its organizational and legal challenges as well as its challenges in relation to National Competition Center. The findings of the research show that although the current challenges of the Council must be seriously addressed, it is expected, due to independence and legal powers of the Council, to witness access to healthy competition in Iranian markets and achieving sustainable economic development after overcoming the challenges.

In terms of market failure, competitive and predictable policy and intervention rights organizations competition is inevitable. The establishment and recognition as an institution, "Competitiveness Council" under Article 53 of Chapter IX law enforcement general policies of Article 44 of the constitution, For its extensive set of functions and powers as well as the presence of high-ranking judges with special powers among its members, Expresses support for Iranian legal and legislative body of values and economic imperatives of the free market and fair competition. Although the composition of the government mostly of its members, the faint presence of representatives of the private sector, lack of legislative support for the principle of independence of the Council and its decisions, the relative heterogeneity of the prohibitions and legal exclusion, Interference with the duties and powers of the Council with other legal entities and the ambiguities of relevant operations, great obstacles in the way of their goals.

The present analysis examines in detail the unknowing departure of Iranian women from the country and getting stuck with a deviation such as prostitution in Turkey, to criticize and analyze the laws related to this deviation, to prevent the continuation of deviant behaviors of women and reduce Such deviations are dealt with by reforming and rehabilitating women instead of suppressing and punishing them. The present research, by proposing reforms in various laws, reaches the conclusion that making some reforms in the laws related to women's deviations is effective in preventing deviant phenomena such as female prostitution and leads to the adoption of legislative criminal policy. There is a difference regarding the deviations of Iranian women in Turkey.This article has been written considering ethical considerations such as honesty, trustworthiness in text analysis and citation. Conclusion: The main hypothesis of the present research, which the legal criminal policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran regarding the prostitution of Iranian women in Turkey should be comprehensive and to be efficient, in response to the main question of the research which states: What should be the legal criminal policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran regarding the prostitution of Iranian women in Turkey? It is proved in the conclusion of the present study. The type of research is theoretical and the research method is descriptive.

Competition law is a newcomer to the legal system recently. A sound understanding of competition policy can provide us with sufficient bases to apply a fundamental and normative view of the issues of competition law. The difference in supervision and regulation determines how the market functions and in order to understand this difference one must understand competition policy. Competition policy may be based on governmental support for national production and industry or on a non-interventional and regulatory posture. Moreover, supervision, based on the principle of non-intervention in the market mechanism, is rooted in liberal ideas; however, regulation, whether as a rule or an exception, is based on the assertion that the market has been ineffective in attaining its goals. Therefore, the government will resort to interventions to regulate inefficiencies.  This paper aims to analyze Supervisory Authority in Implementing Competitive Policy by employing the description method. In this article the author tries to first delineate competition policy, its related requirements and imposed deviations to the market. Then, by defining the supervisory entity and clarifying its distinction from the regulatory institutions, the author considers the characteristics of an appropriate supervisory entity conducting a comparative study of this issue in Iran and the U.S.A. This form of Competition policy because of its applicable experiences which have been well described by recent scholarship is considered suitable for the native system.

The Iranian Competition Law has been introduced under the General Policy Implementation Law of Article 44  of the Constitution. One of the major issues in competition law is the competition body. There are such institutions in different countries, from countries with a long history of competition law, such as the United States, to countries in the Middle East. In Iran, the Competition Council is the only nationally-recognized authority to review anti-competitive practices and has the authority to make various and important decisions. Because these decisions can seriously affect the rights of stakeholders and economic actors, it is necessary to monitor and control their decisions. Due to its paramount importance and existing disagreement, competence of the Administrative Court of Justice in exercising judicial review over the decisions of the Competition Council and its Appeal Board will be investigated in the present study. The research method is descriptive-analytical. Results of the study indicate that to identify the authority competent to exercise judicial review over the competition council, one should pay attention to the structure and nature of the said council and the type of its decisions. The conclusion of the article is that the Administrative Court of Justice has the authority to exercise judicial review over general decisions, case decisions and the decisions and opinions of the Competition Council in the capacity of dealing with anti-competitive procedures. Moreover, the decisions of the Appeal Board of the Competition Council as well as the decisions and actions of the National Competition Center and their officials are subject to judicial review and criminal prosecution of the court.

Purpose: The present study aims to identify and explain the futures of Iranian provinces in the competition for the development of NBIC technological convergence (synergy between nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology and cognitive sciences) with a focus on Yazd province. Method: This research, which has been conducted with a qualitative and descriptive approach, is classified as an exploratory futures-study. In this way, the relevant research records were first reviewed to compile a list of drivers in the development of convergent technologies. The list was then refined and prioritized to identify two key drivers, with the Delphi process attended by fourteen experts. By intersecting the uncertainties of these two drivers, four scenarios of the province's future in technological convergence competition emerged. Findings: The two key drivers affecting the success of the province in the competition for convergent technologies are: the rate of development of the innovation ecosystem and the amount of financial resources allocated to this process. Based on this, four scenarios of the future situation of the province in this field were identified, which have been named as "Vanguard", "Buyer", "Remnant" and "Hired". Conclusion: In order for the provinces to be able to succeed in the forthcoming competitions in the production and operation of convergent technologies, it is necessary to plan for strengthening the ecosystem infrastructure from now; at the same time, it is necessary to make efficient efforts to provide sufficient financial resources for the research and commercialization of these technologies.

One of the issues that have received less attention in competition litigation cases in our legal system is the litigation costs problem. The Competition Council has several tasks under "the Act of the execution of the General Policies of Article 44 of the Constitution"(2007), which requires a great deal of expense to perform optimally. At present, these costs funded by the government. Although in the current state of the economy with considering other countries' approaches to financing these costs, it is better to have at least some of the funding required by the council from other sources (such as receiving fees from private applicants).This study investigates the experiences of the US, Canada, Japan, Turkey, Denmark, the UK, Swiss, Ireland, South Africa, and Hong Kong legal systems in providing competition litigation costs.This article, in an analytical way, examines the justification for collecting litigation costs. Using the experience of other legal systems, it proposes a method (along with suggesting some articles) for allocation of litigation costs in the Iranian competition law and merger control regime to introduce a basis for reforming the law and optimizing Iran's competition system.

The pharmaceutical industry plays an important role in every economy. Although the pharmaceutical sector has distinctive financial features, principles of competition law must be applied to the production and distribution of pharmaceuticals as in all other areas of the economy.Regulations regarding unilateral anticompetitive conduct such as discriminatory pricing, aggressive price setting, abuse of a dominant position, hoarding and refusal to enter into transactions as well as collective anticompetitive practices such as collusion are important competition rules which are applicable in the pharmaceutical industry.Although competition law and regulations are indispensable to the pharmaceutical industry, professional ethics can play an effective role as a deterrent factor and prevent anticompetitive conduct. This article reviews the application of competition law in the pharmaceutical industry and identifies anticompetitive behaviors in this sector. It also focuses on the role of the competition council in monitoring the pharmaceutical industry and the impact of professional ethics in preventing violations of competition law in this sector.

1. IntroductionThe expansion of the Internet and its ever-increasing rate along with the rise of smart mobile phones have made Internet-based businesses one of the inseparable sectors of today's economy. The part that this type of business plays in today’s world economy is so much that now the top companies in the world, in terms of capital and market value, are companies in the field of digital economy.  This is a reality that Iran will also face in the not-too-distant future; then, companies in the field of digital economy will take a significant share of the market. So, today, it is especially necessary to pay attention to the issue of competition in digital platforms and to set the appropriate rules to govern them. Literature ReviewUntil the writing of this article, most of the issues raised in Iran's competition law are devoted to the examination of rules governing competition in traditional markets. Only one article titled "Competition Council and Internet Businesses" by Zarei et al. (2019) has been written in relation to platform markets, and this work is also based on the traditional rules of competition law and regardless of the specific challenges of this field. Analysis of the vote number 306 of the Competition Council. Therefore, it can be claimed that the explanation of the characteristics and challenges of platform markets and its effect on the regulation of competition in this field, which is examined in this article, qualifies as innovation. MethodologyIn order to correctly set the new rules applicable in the field of digital platforms’ competition, it is necessary to go through a three-stage system: first, we must get a correct understanding of the prominent features of the digital platform markets that affect the issue of competition. In the second stage, the competitive challenges arising from these characteristics, with which the traditional rules are not able to fully deal, should be examined and evaluated; and finally, new rules of competition in the field of platform markets based on the aforementioned characteristics and challenges should be put in place.As the title of the article suggests, the purpose of this article is to explain and analyze the first and second stages of the aforementioned process to show the deficiency of traditional rules in response to the competitive challenges of the field of digital platforms and the necessity of revising them. For this purpose, after explaining the meaning of "platform" and its conceptual evolution over time (the first part), the prominent features of digital platforms that affect the issue of competition are counted, identified, and evaluated (the second part) and finally, the challenges due to the aforementioned characteristics and the inadequacy of the traditional rules in response to them will be explained (part three) to prove the necessity of revising the traditional rules of competition law in the field of platform markets. ConclusionBased on the findings of this article, the main economic features of digital platforms are such as "the network effect", "reduction of transaction costs", "replacement of ownership with access", "fragmentation of supply and demand", "economy of scale and economy of significant scope", "simultaneous improvement of economies of scale and personalization" and "fundamental importance of data". Although they are not entirely new and traces of them can be seen in traditional markets, their simultaneous presence in digital platforms makes the market tend towards them. In addition, this problem may be aggravated by the actions of digital platforms to strengthen and expand their position in the market. It is noteworthy that none of the aforementioned features that have led to the occurrence of the mentioned challenges have been recognized in the traditional rules of competition as an obstacle to entering the market or as an anti-competitive practice. Therefore, the first competitive challenge of platform markets, which requires the regulation of appropriate rules, is the growing monopoly of these markets. Naturally, the most suitable solution to get out of this situation is to recognize the aforementioned features as specific types of entry barriers for digital markets.It should also be kept in mind that the preliminary stages to apply anti-competitive rules and guaranteeing them in digital platform markets face serious challenges. In these markets, it is not possible to identify the product as easily as it is in traditional markets, and the application of the conventional SSNIP test cannot be applied to many platforms that offer zero-price services or two- or multi-modal platforms. This makes it a serious challenge to recognize the exact share of the platform in the market and, accordingly, to recognize the market power. It seems that the transition from "quantitative criteria" to "qualitative criteria" is the way out of such challenges.Also, following the traditional rules in recognizing the anti-competitive behavior of platforms, causes many platforms to be accused of aggressive pricing at the very beginning due to having zero marginal cost. In addition, the existence of the aforementioned features has facilitated the conditions for committing anti-competitive acts, such as establishing exclusive conditions in the transaction, selling a package of products, collusion, etc. It seems that the requirement to overcoming such challenges is to promote ex-ante regulations along with the implementation of the current (mostly a-posteriori) regulation model.Finally, it seems that the simultaneous presence of these features in digital platforms has largely led to the reemergence of traditional issues of competition law as current issues, and this will consequently require a review of competition laws in this area, as countries such as the United States, China, and the European Union have followed the same path.